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Evidence
by John E. Hall, Jr.*
and W. Scott Henwood"
Facts are stubborn things; and whatever may be our wishes, our
inclinations, or the dictates of our passion, they cannot alter the state
of facts and evidence. John Adams'
I.

INTRODUCTION

The biggest story in Georgia Evidence law this year2 is undoubtedly
the Georgia General Assembly's decision to align Georgia's evidence code
with the Federal Rules of Evidence.? Proponents of House Bill 24
describe the former rules, many of which have been on the books for
more than 150 years, as archaic and inconsistent.' Paul S. Milich,
professor of law at Georgia State University College of Law and the
reporter for the State Bar of Georgia committee that proposed the new
rules of evidence for Georgia, described the way the outdated rules
impeded the modern practice of law in Georgia: "Our 19th-century
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1. John Adams, Argument in Defense of the British Soldiers in the Boston Massacre
Trials (Dec. 4, 1770), in 3 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 269 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller

B. Zobel eds., 1965).
2. For an analysis of Georgia evidence law during the prior survey period, see John E.
Hall, Jr. & W. Scott Henwood, Evidence, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 62 MERCER L.
REV. 125 (2010).

3. Ga. H.R. Bill 24, Reg. Sess.
4.

Paul S. Milich, Court Rules will Benefit Public, ATLANTA J. CONST., May 25, 2011,

http://www.ajc.com/opinion/court-rules-will-benefit-957487.html.
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evidence rules do not fit the 21st century very well. Phones did not exist
when Georgia's evidence code was written in 1860, let alone cars, videos,
computers, or even Facebook." With this change, Georgia joins fortythree other states that have adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence,
including all states bordering Georgia. Attorneys practicing in Georgia
may have some studying to do to become familiar with the new code;
however, the Bill's supporters argue that this should not be a problem
since many attorneys have experience in federal court or remember some
of the rules from their law school days.'
These changes represent the culmination of a twenty-year struggle to
conform Georgia's code to the Federal Rules of Evidence, which began
when Governor Nathan Deal, then leader of the Senate, carried the
proposed changes to a unanimous vote in the Senate, only to be defeated
in the House.' Because the new legislation becomes effective January
1, 2013,' it does not affect cases that are surveyed in this article, which
were decided from June 1, 2010 to May 31, 2011. However, judges have
already started to take note of the forthcoming changes.10
II.

BEST EVIDENCE RULE

As supporters of Georgia's adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence
have noted, Georgia courts have struggled to apply the Georgia Rules of
Evidence in determining the admissibility of various types of electronic
evidence.n One area of evidence law in which Georgia has struggled
with technological advances is the application of the Best Evidence Rule,
which governs the version of documents that can be used as evidence
when the contents of the documents are at issue." The Georgia version

5. Id.
6. Id.
7. John Gramlich, Georgia Rewrites its TrialRules, Replacing a 19th Century System,
STATELINE (May 26,2011), http://www.stateline.org/live/printable/story?contentId=577213.
8. Milich, supra note 4.
9. Ga. H.R. Bill 24, § 1, Reg. Sess.
10. See Bethel v. Fleming, 310 Ga. App. 717, 723 n.6, 713 S.E.2d 900, 905 n.6 (2011).
The court in Bethel noted the following:
The General Assembly recently amended the Georgia Code to substantially revise,
supersede, and modernize provisions relating to evidence "to adopt the Federal
Rules of Evidence, as interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States and
the United States circuit courts of appeal as of January 1, 2013 . . . ." See House

Bill 24, Ga. L. 2011, p. 1, § 1. Although the amended code sections do not apply
in this case, we nevertheless note that they are consistent with our conclusion
here. See House Bill 24, Ga. L. 2011, p. 3, § 2.
Id.
11. See Milich, supra note 4.
12. See, e.g., Baptiste v. State, 288 Ga. 653, 656, 706 S.E.2d 442, 445 (2011).

2011]

EVIDENCE

155

of the rule codified in section 24-5-4 of the Official Code of Georgia
Annotated (O.C.G.A.)," reads:
(a) The best evidence which exists of a writing sought to be proved
shall be produced, unless its absence shall be satisfactorily accounted
for.
(b) Written evidence of a writing is considered of higher proof than oral
evidence. In all cases where the parties have reduced their contract,
agreement, or stipulation to writing and have assented thereto, such
writing is the best evidence of the same.14
The Federal Rules of Evidence similarly require production of the
However, in contrast to
original writing to prove its contents.1 5
Georgia's articulation of the original writing requirement, the federal
version provides for the use of electronically duplicated copies as
acceptable versions of the original.1 6 For example, computer printouts
are included in the definition of original: "If data are stored in a
computer or similar device, any printout or other output readable by
sight, shown to reflect the data accurately, is an 'original.""' The
Georgia Supreme Court recently interpreted the lack of a similar
provision regarding computer printouts to mean that, under Georgia's
articulation of the Best Evidence Rule, printouts from computers,
notwithstanding their accuracy, are not "originals."8
In Baptiste v. State,'" Gerard George Baptiste objected at a pretrial
hearing for his felony murder trial to the admission of evidence collected
during searches of his residence and vehicle. In response to this
objection, the prosecution produced copies of warrants issued for the
searches at issue. Attached to the copies of the warrants was an
unsigned, unsworn affidavit by the county investigator.2 0 The investigator testified that the original warrants and his original signed
affidavit had been "retained and sealed" by the issuing judge, who was
now unable to locate the original documents.2 1 The investigator also
testified that, in the presence of the assistant district attorney and a

13. O.C.G.A. § 24-5-4 (2010).
14. Id.
15. FED. R. EVID. 1002. The rule states: "To prove the content of a writing, recording,
or photograph, the original writing, recording, or photograph is required, except as
otherwise provided in these rules or by Act of Congress." Id.
16. Id. at 1001(4).
17. Id. at 1001(3).
18. Baptiste, 288 Ga. at 656, 706 S.E.2d at 445.
19. 288 Ga. 653, 706 S.E.2d 442 (2011).
20. Id. at 655, 706 S.E.2d at 444.
21. Id.
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detective, he retrieved the unsigned version of the affidavit from a
computer in the sheriff's office on which the original affidavit was
composed.2 2 He also confirmed the accuracy of the unsworn version of
the document, affirming that it contained the following:
[Ilnformation identical to that contained in the affidavit he had
executed before the issuing judge in order to obtain the warrant for
appellant's truck and, with the deletion of the last 6 1/4 lines, was
identical to the affidavit he had executed before the issuing judge to
obtain the warrant for appellant's residence.23
The trial court found that this version of the affidavit was a satisfactory
"duplicate original" and denied the motion to suppress.2 4
Baptiste appealed, and the Georgia Supreme Court held that the
affidavit printed from the sheriff's computer did not satisfy the Best
Evidence Rule in Georgia.2 5 Justice Benham noted that Georgia's
evidence rules did not explicitly allow printouts from computers as
duplicate originals, and to qualify as such, the document produced by the
prosecution should have been made "by the same pen stroke at the same
time . . . or [the document is] not a copy executed at the same time as

the 'original' of the document."
The supreme court held, however,
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the unsworn
affidavit because Georgia's evidence code permits the admission of
secondary evidence upon a showing that the original document was lost
or unavailable." Given the officer's testimony about the sealed, and
now unavailable, original warrants and affidavits, the court reasoned
that the trial court did not commit error in permitting the secondary
evidence.2 8
III.

A.

CHARACTER EVIDENCE

Similar Tansactions

As noted in the previous survey,29 Georgia is the only jurisdiction in
the United States that allows admission of a criminal defendant's past

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 656, 706 S.E.2d at 444-45.
Id. at 655-56, 706 S.E.2d at 444.
Id. at 656, 706 S.E.2d at 445 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting McGee v. State, 260 Ga. 178, 178, 391 S.E.2d 400, 402 (1990)).
Id. at 656-57, 706 S.E.2d at 445.
Hall & Henwood, supra note 2.

2011]1

EVIDENCE

157

crimes or acts to serve as evidence of the defendant's "bent of mind"
toward the conduct at issue in the case.30
During the survey period, the Georgia Court of Appeals has once again
noted its disapproval of admitting this type of evidence, referring to the
need for the Georgia General Assembly or the Georgia Supreme Court
to amend the rule. For example, in Steele v. State," the defendant
argued that the use of a prior DUI conviction to show his bent of mind
or course of conduct, when it was not needed to supply proof of a missing
element to the prosecution's case, violated the rule against character
evidence." The court of appeals noted that there were concerns with
using similar transaction evidence to prove bent of mind, but that they
were bound to follow precedent in allowing its admission: "Only the
Supreme Court of Georgia or the Georgia General Assembly has the
authority to depart from this state's established (and unique) rule on the
admissibility of similar transaction evidence.""
B.

Unsavory Groups
In a rare move, the Georgia Supreme Court recently reversed a
murder conviction because of improperly admitted character evidence.
In Boring v. State," Courtney Boring was convicted of murdering her
mother in February 2007.3' The supreme court reversed the conviction,
but not for lack of evidence of Boring's guilt in her mother's slaying.
In fact, Chief Justice Hunstein noted in her opinion that the evidence
"was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a
reasonable doubt that appellant was guilty of the crimes of which she
was convicted." However, the court held that it was reversible error
for the trial court to admit character evidence suggesting that the
defendant was under "satanic influences."" At trial, the prosecution
introduced various evidence collected by police officers from the fifteenyear-old's bedroom." Evidence admitted over the defense's objection
included:

30. Wade v. State, 295 Ga. App. 45, 48, 670 S.E.2d 864, 866 (2008); see also Hall &
Henwood, supra note 2, at 130-31.
31. 306 Ga. App. 870, 703 S.E.2d 5 (2010).
32. Id. at 871-73, 703 S.E.2d at 7-8.
33. Id. at 873, 703 S.E.2d at 8.
34. 289 Ga. 429, 711 S.E.2d 634 (2011).
35. Id. at 429 & n.1, 711 S.E.2d at 635 & n.1.
36. See id. at 432, 711 S.E.2d at 637.
37. Id.
38. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
39. Id.
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photographs of appellant with dyed black hair and dark make-up; a
document bearing the words of a "curse" to be recited "while burning
the letter over a black candle"; and seven different inscriptions, one
typewritten and the rest handwritten on the bedroom walls, of song
lyrics and quotations attributed to various singers and other artists,
40
bearing themes of anguish, enslavement, atheism, and violence.
In its analysis, the supreme court noted that it has, in past cases,
admitted evidence of membership in "unsavory" or unpopular groups,

despite the evidence's incidental bearing on the defendant's character,
when a sufficient connection existed between the crime involved and the
For example, the court has upheld
beliefs or practices of the group.
the admission of evidence regarding a defendant's membership in a
satanic cult when there was evidence that the killing was the result of
a satanic ritual.4 2 In Boring, however, the court determined that there
was no such nexus between the crime and the girl's alleged gothic
Thus, the prosecution's use of the evidence was an
lifestyle."
impermissible attempt to draw the jury's attention to the defendant's
beliefs, which the jury would likely find unsavory or immoral, rather
than a permissible effort to establish a motive.44 The supreme court's
decision was a strong statement about the effect character evidence can
have on a trial, but it also exemplifies the thin and often blurry line
between admissible and impermissible character evidence in Georgia.
IV.

FOURTH AMENDMENT SEARCH AND SEIZURE

Cell Phone Data

A.

Much of the case law discussing evidentiary issues involves the
suppression or admission of evidence gathered by law enforcement
officers that implicates the Fourth Amendment constitutional protection
against unreasonable search and seizure." This has become particularly relevant after the United States Supreme Court's decision in Arizona
v. Gant.4 6 In Gant, the Supreme Court held that

40.
41.

Id.
Id. at 433-34, 711 S.E.2d at 638 (citing Clark v. State, 271 Ga. 6,9,515 S.E.2d 155,

159 (1999)).
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. (citing McIntyre v. State, 266 Ga. 7, 11, 463 S.E.2d 476, 481 (1995)).
Id. at 434-35, 711 S.E.2d at 638.
Id. at 434-35, 711 S.E.2d at 638-39.
See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
556 U.S. 332, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009).
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when an officer lawfully arrests the occupant or recent occupant of an
automobile, and "when it is reasonable to believe that evidence of the
offense of arrest might be found in the vehicle," the officer may search
the passenger compartment of the automobile for such evidence as an
incident of the arrest ... .7
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Gant, lower courts have grappled
with its scope, particularly in cases where there is no imminent risk that
evidence will be destroyed."8
During the survey period, the Georgia Court of Appeals applied "[t]he
most restrictive plausible interpretation" of that decision and found that
the warrantless search of electronic data stored on a defendant's cell
phone was reasonable as part of a search of a defendant's vehicle
incident to arrest."9 In Hawkins v. State," the defendant (Hawkins)
was arrested on multiple charges after sending text messages regarding
drug sales to a cell phone that a mother had turned over to police
because she was concerned that her son was receiving drug-related
messages. Officers continued to correspond with Hawkins, who believed
she was communicating with the son, and set up a time and place to
meet for what she believed was a drug sale. When Hawkins arrived at
the restaurant, she was arrested and officers searched her vehicle with
her consent and incident to her arrest. In the car, officers located the
cell phone in Hawkins's purse and downloaded the messages exchanged
with her that day. Hawkins challenged the search and seizure of the
cell phone, claiming that it violated her Fourth Amendment rights."
Rejecting her claim, the court of appeals noted that when officers are
authorized to search a vehicle for a specific piece of evidence, they are
also permitted to search any container that might reasonably contain the
object for which they are searching." The court then reasoned that a
cell phone should be treated like a container in the context of an
authorized warrantless search for evidence." Further, the court held
that the officer did not exceed the scope of his authority to search the
phone since he merely searched for and downloaded the messages sent
to the phone in his possession.5 4 Therefore, the court held, the search

47.
129 S.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Hawkins v. State, 307 Ga. App. 253, 255, 704 S.E.2d 886,889 (2010) (quoting Gant,
Ct. at 1714).
See, e.g., Hawkins, 307 Ga. App. at 255-56, 704 S.E.2d at 889.
Id. at 256, 704 S.E.2d at 889-90.
307 Ga. App. 253, 704 S.E.2d 886 (2010).
Id. at 253-55, 704 S.E.2d at 888-89.
Id. at 255-56, 704 S.E.2d at 889-90.
Id. at 258, 704 S.E.2d at 891.
Id. at 259, 704 S.E.2d at 892.
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of the cell phone did not violate Hawkins's Fourth Amendment rights,
and the text messages were admissible." Cell phones differ substantially from traditional containers in that they lack the finite capacity to
hold tangible objects." Therefore, the court urged that application of
the principles for traditional container searches to cell phones should be
done with "great care and caution."" However, this decision could
serve as an important tool for officers gathering electronic evidence, and
it serves as an example of Georgia courts' attempt to define the scope of
Gant.
The Exclusionary Rule
Part of the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable search
and seizure is the exclusionary rule, which restricts admission of
evidence obtained during unlawful searches." The purpose of the rule
is to deter unconstitutional searches by limiting the ability of the
prosecution to use the resulting evidence against the defendant;
however, this rule is not unlimited: "Because the rule is not constitutionally mandated and because of its broad deterrent purpose, it consistently
has been applied only 'where its remedial objectives are thought most
efficaciously served.""' To determine when to apply the exclusionary
rule to proceedings other than criminal trials, the United States
Supreme Court has adopted a balancing test in which the likelihood of
deterring unconstitutional searches is weighed against the potential
harm of excluding the evidence."o
On the last day of the survey period, the Georgia Supreme Court
applied this balancing test and refused to extend the exclusionary rule
to probation revocation proceedings. In State v. Thackston," the
supreme court reversed the court of appeals grant of a motion to
suppress unconstitutionally collected evidence during a probation
revocation hearing." The supreme court reasoned that because the
goal of the probation system is to rehabilitate offenders, it is vital to the
administration of that system that all relevant and reliable evidence be
heard during revocation proceedings.6 Further, the court held that the
B.

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id.
Id. at 257-58, 704 S.E.2d at 891.
Id.
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974).
State v. Thackston, No. S10G1337, 2011 WL 2118928, at *1 (Ga. May 31, 2011).
Id. at *2 (citing Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 347-48 (1987)).
No. S10G1337, 2011 WL 2118928 (Ga. May 31, 2011).
Id. at *1.
Id. at *2-3.
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exclusionary rule's application to criminal proceedings sufficiently
deterred unconstitutional searches, and the potential deterrent effect of
extending the rule to revocation proceedings was outweighed by the need
to thoroughly evaluate as much evidence as possible about the probationer's readiness to reintegrate into society.64 This decision brings Georgia
in line with the majority of jurisdictions that have declined to extend the
application of the exclusionary rule to probation revocation proceedings,
and it overruled all Georgia cases to the contrary.65
V.

CHILD CUSTODY CASES

During the survey period, the Georgia Supreme Court had the
opportunity to clarify a narrow, but important, area of evidentiary law.
In Pace v. Pace," the court held that in making final determinations
of child custody decisions, lower courts should not rely on evidence
In Pace, the husband filed for
introduced at preliminary hearings.6
divorce, and, during the preliminary hearing, the court awarded

temporary physical custody of the couple's minor son to the husband and
joint legal custody to both parties. At the bench trial in which the
divorce decree was entered, the husband was granted sole legal and
physical custody of the child, and the wife subsequently appealed."
The supreme court held that despite the lack of guidance from the

statute and the court rules regarding child custody determinations, it
was reversible error for the trial court to rely on the testimony proffered
at the preliminary hearing without notifying the parties.69

64. Id. at *3.
65. Id. The court noted:
We also overrule the following cases to the extent they hold illegally seized
evidence is inadmissible in probation revocation hearings: Colvert v. State, 237 Ga.
App. 670, 516 S.E.2d 377 (1999) (vacating and remanding where trial court
revoked probation based on evidence that may have been subject to suppression);
Owens v. State, 153 Ga. App. 525, 265 S.E.2d 856 (1980) (reversing revocation of
probation based on improper admission of illegally seized evidence at revocation
hearing); Adams v. State, 153 Ga. App. 41, 264 S.E.2d 532 (1980) (holding illegally
seized evidence inadmissible in revocation hearing); Porterv. State, 142 Ga. App.
481, 236 S.E.2d 172 (1977) (same); Giles v. State, 149 Ga. App. 263, 254 S.E.2d
154 (1979).
Id. n.2.
66. 287 Ga. 899, 700 S.E.2d 571 (2010).
67. Id. at 901, 700 S.E.2d at 573.
68. Id. at 899-900, 700 S.E.2d at 572.
69. Id. at 900-01, 700 S.E.2d at 572-73.
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PLAINTIFFS As EVIDENCE

Decisions on admissibility of evidence very often require examination
of the effect the evidence will have on the jury. Weighing the probative
value of a particular piece of evidence against the potential for unfair
prejudice is essential to many admissibility determinations. Limiting
the presence of a party in the courtroom during trial now requires a
related analysis in Georgia.o
Generally, civil parties have the right to be present at all stages of
trial.n However, this right may be limited in certain circumstances
without violating due process, such as when the presence of a severely
injured or disabled plaintiff before the jury could unfairly prejudice the
defendant's case.7 2 Until the current survey period, Georgia courts had
not examined the circumstances under which a defendant could seek to
have an injured plaintiff excluded from the courtroom without running
afoul of that plaintiffs constitutionally protected rights. 3
4 the Georgia Court of Appeals followed the
In Kesterson v. Jarrett,"
lead of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and
outlined circumstances in which a plaintiff's presence at trial is not a
right, such as when "the plaintiff functions almost as an exhibit, as a
piece of evidence," rather than a meaningful participant in the proceeding."
In Kesterson, the parents, Catherine and Ross Kesterson,
individually and on behalf of their daughter, Kyla, brought a medical
malpractice case alleging that Kyla was deprived of oxygen immediately
preceding her birth, which resulted in neurological injuries. In response
to the defendants' motion to exclude Kyla from the courtroom, the trial
court concluded that Kyla would be introduced to the jury during voir
dire, and then her presence would be limited absent a finding by the
court that her presence was essential and relevant, with the court
reserving the right to remove Kyla from the courtroom if her presence
became disruptive or prejudicial to the defendant. The plaintiffs
requested that Kyla be allowed in the courtroom during the testimony
of three witnesses. The court denied their request with respect to two
of the witnesses. The plaintiffs appealed this ruling after the jury found

70. Kesterson v. Jarrett, 307 Ga. App. 244, 249-50, 704 S.E.2d 878, 883-84(2010), cert.
granted.
71. Cox v. Yates, 96 Ga. App. 466, 466, 100 S.E.2d 649, 651 (1957).
72. Kesterson, 307 Ga. App. at 249, 704 S.E.2d at 883.
73. See id.
74. 307 Ga. App. 244, 704 S.E.2d 878 (2010).
75. Id. at 248-50, 704 S.E.2d at 883-84.
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for the defense." The court of appeals concluded that while the trial
court did not thoroughly examine and explain their decision to exclude
Kyla, the error was harmless." However, the court provided instructions for trial courts on how to handle requests to exclude injured
plaintiffs in the future:
[When, after an evidentiary hearing upon a written motion and after
an opportunity to observe the plaintiff, the court makes the following
factual findings in a written order: (1) the plaintiff is severely injured;
(2) the plaintiff attributes those injuries to the conduct of the defendant(s); (3) there is a substantial likelihood that the plaintiff's presence
in the courtroom will cause the jury to be biased toward the plaintiff
based on sympathy rather than the evidence such that the jury would
be prevented or substantially impaired from performing its duty; (4)
the plaintiff is unable to communicate with counsel or to participate in
the trial in any meaningful way; and (5) the plaintiff is unable to
comprehend the proceedings."
In conducting the inquiry, courts should examine the plaintiff in person,
on video, or through other reliable means to evaluate the above factors
The holding of the court of appeals recognizes that
objectively."
plaintiffs can serve evidentiary purposes, and their ability to assist
counsel should be weighed against the risk that their presence impairs
the fact-finding mission of the jury.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Major changes are on the horizon for Georgia's evidence code. It
remains uncertain exactly how those changes will affect judges and
attorneys practicing in the state. However, given the importance of the
rules of evidence in shaping litigation, it is clear the effect will be
substantial.

76. Id. at 244-47, 704 S.E.2d at 880-82.
77. Id. at 250-51, 704 S.E.2d at 884.
78. Id. at 250, 704 S.E.2d at 884.
79. Id. at 250 n.6, 704 S.E.2d at 884 n.6.

